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Zoning and Land Use Law
by Dennis J. Webb Jr.*
Marcia McCrory Ernst"
Davend D. Walker'
and Kelley B. Gray**
This Article provides a succinct and practical analysis of the significant judicial decisions in the area of zoning and land use law handed
down by Georgia appellate courts between June 1, 2008 and May 31,
2009.1 The cases surveyed fall primarily within five categories: (1)
zoning; (2) condemnation; (3) nuisance and trespass; (4) easements and
restrictive covenants; and (5) miscellaneous.
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1. For analysis of Georgia zoning and land use law during the prior survey period, see
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MERCER L. REv. 457 (2008).
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ZONING

Property Owner Not Indispensible Party on Zoning Appeal

In Stendahl v. Cobb County,2 a rezoning applicant sought to rezone
a sixty-five acre parcel. After the rezoning request was granted,
neighbors filed an appeal, challenging the rezoning decision. The
neighbors fied a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to join an
indispensible party. In support, they noted that the rezoning applicant
did not own the subject property. Instead, the applicant entered into a
purchase and sale agreement with the property owner, and the contract
was contingent upon the rezoning applicant obtaining rezoning. The
trial court granted the motion.4 On review, the Georgia Supreme Court
reversed, holding as follows:
While the trial court was correct in its observation that the new zoning
designation runs with the land and is not personal to the applicants
who obtained it, it does not necessarily follow that the owners of the
property are indispensable parties for purposes of an appeal from the
grant of the re-zoning application. When the owner of the property for
which re-zoning is sought is not the applicant for re-zoning but has
entered into a contract for the sale of the property with the re-zoning
applicant, which contract is contingent upon the applicant obtaining rezoning, the owner does not fit within the definition of "indispensable
party" because the case could be decided on its merits without
prejudicing the rights of the owners since the re-zoning applicant is a
party and presents a thorough case on behalf of itself and, ultimately,
the owner.5
B. Public Service Commission Has Authority to Regulate Placement
of Substations But is Not Required to Exercise This Authority
In Georgia Public Service Commission v. Turnage, residential
property owners filed a petition with the Georgia Public Service
Commission (PSC) to halt construction of an electrical substation. The
PSC dismissed the petition, claiming it had no authority to regulate the
siting of electrical substations and stating that neither regulations nor
criteria had been created to guide decisions on siting. The property

2.
3.
4.
5.
219,
6.

284 Ga. 525, 668 S.E.2d 723 (2008).
Id. at 525, 668 S.E.2d at 725.
See id. at 527-28, 668 S.E.2d at 726-27.
Id. at 528-29,668 S.E.2d at 727 (citing Guhl v. Tuggle, 242 Ga. 412,414,249 S.E.2d
221 (1978)).
284 Ga. 610, 669 S.E.2d 138 (2008).
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owners filed a petition for judicial review and a writ of mandamus in the
trial court. The trial court denied the petition for judicial review on
standing grounds.7 It granted the petition for mandamus, however,
"refus[ing] to countenance the counterintuitive proposition that there
is no agency with the authority to make zoning-like decisions or
provide any governmental review with regard to the siting of substations" or other complex construction projects, and finding that [Georgia
law] "expressly vests the PSC with that power and thus holds that the
PSC has a clear public duty to hear [the property owners'] case."'
Upon review, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed.? The supreme court
recognized the trial court's correct determination that the PSC's granted
powers included authority to regulate substation placement. 0 However, the court then reasoned that "whether preemption results from a
statutory delegation of authority [was] a separate question from whether
the PSC... actually exercised the particular power it [was] granted.""
Because the PSC did not have rules and regulations covering substation
placement, the PSC had not exercised its power over substation
siting. 2 The court also noted that contrary to the trial court's reasoning, the supreme court "[had] not found any requirement that every
property or even every complex construction project be subject to zoninglike restrictions." 3 A mere grant of governmental power does not
imply a duty to exercise the granted power, and the court held that this
case at most involved a power that was optional to exercise.
C.

Developer's § 1983 Equal Protection Claim Upheld
In Fulton County v. Legacy Investment Group, LLC, 5 the plaintiff
was a large volume developer and builder of single-family homes in
Fulton County, Georgia for several years. 6 In the spring and summer
of 2006, the plaintiff was cited twice for violating the Fulton County Soil

7. Id. at 610-11, 669 S.E.2d at 138-39.
8. Id. at 611, 669 S.E.2d at 139 (first alteration in original) (citing City of Buford v.
Ga. Power Co., 276 Ga. 590, 581 S.E.2d 16 (2003)).
9. Id. at 613, 669 S.E.2d at 140.
10. Id. at 612, 669 S.E.2d at 139.
11. Id., 669 S.E.2d at 140.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 296 Ga. App. 822, 676 S.E.2d 388 (2009).
16. Id. at 822, 676 S.E.2d at 390.
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Erosion and Sedimentation Control Ordinance of 2005.17 Subsequently,
the county notified the builder it intended to bar the builder from
receiving land disturbance permits for a three-year period pursuant to
local law."1
In a letter to the plaintiff, the county stated that it
intended to enforce section 26-40(b)(8) of the Fulton County Code.1 9
Section 26-40(b)(8) provides that "[ilf a permit [applicant] has had two
or more violations of previous permits, this article, or the Erosion and
Sedimentation Act, as amended, within three years prior to the date of
filing of the application under consideration, Fulton County shall deny
the permit application."20 The letter continued by stating the county
would deny the land disturbance permit applications for a period of
three years from the date of the builder's permit violation of April 28,
2006, due to the builder's multiple violations of previous permits; and all
applications prior to that date were also denied.2
Shortly after receiving the debarment notice, the builder filed a
complaint against the county, seeking damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 198322 and Georgia law' for violation of equal protection rights.'
The builder also sought attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 198825
and section 13-6-11 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), 26 as well as a declaratory judgment that the ordinance violated due
process. 27 Subsequently, the county withdrew its debarment notice,
and the superior court denied the declaratory judgment petition as moot
and entered judgment on a jury verdict for the builder on the § 1983
claim. Both parties appealed.28
The county argued that no developer has a vested property interest in
receiving a land disturbance permit and, therefore, that the trial court
erred in denying its motion for directed verdict on the builder's equal
protection claim.29 Rejecting this claim, the court of appeals stated
that the county's argument was based on the faulty premise that
17. FULTON COUNTY, GA., CODE OF LAws §§ 26-35 to -48 (Municode through Dec. 5,
2007); Legacy Inv. Group, 296 Ga. App. at 822, 676 S.E.2d at 390-91.
18. Legacy Inv. Group, 296 Ga. App. at 823, 676 S.E.2d at 391.
19. FULTON COUNTY, GA., CODE OF LAWS § 26-40(bX8) (Municode through Dec. 5,2007);
Legacy Inv. Group, 296 Ga. App. at 823, 676 S.E.2d at 391.
20. FULTON COUNTY, GA., CODE OF LAws § 26-40(b)(8).
21. Legacy Inv. Group, 296 Ga. App. at 823, 676 S.E.2d at 391.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
23. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 2.
24. Legacy Inv. Group, 296 Ga. App. at 823, 824, 676 S.E.2d at 391.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006).
26. O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 (1982 & Supp. 2009).
27. Legacy Inv. Group, 296 Ga. App. at 824, 676 S.E.2d at 391.
28. Id., 676 S.E.2d at 391-92.
29. Id. at 825, 676 S.E.2d at 392.
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identification of a property interest was required for an equal protection
claim. 0
The Fourteenth Amendment 3' itself demonstrates that
interests in property and liberty are irrelevant to such claims. 2 The
court stated that "'to properly plead an equal protection claim, a plaintiff
need only allege that ... through state action, similarly situated persons
have been treated disparately."'
The court also vacated the trial court's ruling that the builder's
petition for declaratory judgment was moot.' The court stated that the
ordinance remained on the books despite the county's withdrawal of the
debarment notice. 5 The county thus was required to deny future
applications so long as the builder had two or more violations within
three years preceding any future applications. 6 The court stated that
although "a petition seeking a declaration that a particular debarment
notice was void would presumably be rendered moot by the withdrawal
of the notice, [the builder] did not seek a declaration that the ...
sought a declaration
debarment notice was void."3" The builder instead
38
that the ordinance itself was unconstitutional.
D. The ZPL Requirement of PublicationFifteen Days, But Not More
Than Forty-five Days, Priorto a Hearing is Not Extended When the
Forty-fifth Day Falls on a Weekend
In C & H Development, LLC v. Franklin County,39 neighbors challenged the county's grant of a conditional use permit. Among other
things, the neighbors argued that the notice of the public hearing on the
neighbor's conditional use permit did not comply with the zoning
procedures law. The notice was published forty-six days before the
hearing date,4" not forty-five days as required by O.C.G.A. § 36-664(a).4' In response, the county argued that the forty-fifth day fell on a
Sunday, and therefore, under Georgia law, the time limit would be

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV.
Legacy Inv. Group, 296 Ga. App. at 825, 676 S.E.2d at 392.
Id. (quoting Thigpen v. Bibb County, 223 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir. 2000)).
Id. at 828, 676 S.E.2d at 394.

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.

38. Id.
39. 294 Ga. App. 792, 670 S.E.2d 491 (2008).
40. Id. at 792, 793, 670 S.E.2d at 492.
41. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-4(a) (2006).
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extended to the following Monday. 42 The trial court granted the
county's motion for summary judgment.43
On review, the court of appeals reversed.4 ' The county argued that
if the forty-fifth day after publication fell on a Sunday, its Board of
45
Commissioners could hold the public hearing the following Monday.
However, under O.C.G.A. § 36-66-4(a), the county was required to
publish notice of the hearing "[alt least [fifteen] but not more than
[forty-five] days prior to the date of the hearing."' The court held that
the hearing date was the date from which the time limits of the notice
had to be considered. 47 Because the hearing was not set for Sunday
and was not held on that day, no pertinent date fell on a Sunday for
purposes of O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(d)(3). 4"
II. CONDEMNATION
During the survey period, the Georgia appellate courts decided several
condemnation cases dealing with procedural, evidentiary, and business
loss issues. Some of the more interesting and instructive cases are
discussed herein.
A. A Property Owner's Untimely Notices of Appeal Were Not Excused
Based on the Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel
In Cedartown North Partnership, LLC v. Georgia Department of
49 the Georgia Department of Transportation
Thansportation,
(GDOT)
filed two condemnation petitions on August 11, 2006, to acquire two
parcels of property owned by Cedartown North Partnership, LLC, as well
as easements and access rights. Thirty-four days after Cedartown was
served in the two cases, it filed notices of appeal challenging the amount
of compensation deposited by the GDOT in the registry of the court. 50
Relying on O.C.G.A. § 32-3-14," 1 the GDOT moved to dismiss the
appeals on the ground that the notices of appeal were untimely because

42. C & H Dev., 294 Ga. App. at 794, 670 S.E.2d at 493.
43. Id. at 792, 670 S.E.2d at 492.

44. Id. at 795, 670 S.E.2d at 493.
45. Id. at 794, 670 S.E.2d at 493.
46.

O.C.G.A. § 36-66-4(a).

47. C & H Dev., 294 Ga. App. at 794, 670 S.E.2d at 493.
48. O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(dX3) (2000 & Supp. 2009); C & H Dev., 294 Ga. App. at 794, 670
S.E.2d at 493.

49. 296 Ga. App. 54, 673 S.E.2d 562 (2009).
50. Id. at 54, 673 S.E.2d at 564.
51.

O.C.G..

-

§ 32-3-14 (2009).
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they were filed outside the thirty-day appeal period. The trial court
granted the motion.5 2
On appeal, Cedartown asserted that the GDOT was equitably estopped
by its counsel's misleading and false statements from relying on the
thirty-day appeal period5 3 or, in the alternative, that under O.C.G.A.
§ 9-3-96, 5' the appeal period was tolled.' The court of appeals rejected both arguments."
First, the court noted:
We have previously held that "Itihe right to appeal to a jury from a
declaration of taking [is] absolutely conditional upon the filing of a
timely notice of appeal in the superior court," pursuant to [O.C.G.A.]
§ 32-3-14 and that "[nlot even the trial court is empowered to extend
the period of time for filing the notice of appeal. " "7
Thus, the court of appeals held that the "trial court did not err in
declining to excuse Cedartown's untimely notices of appeal based on the
doctrine of equitable estoppel." 68
Second, the court of appeals disagreed that the thirty-day appeal
period was tolled under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 by the GDOT's fraud.59 The
court noted that pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96, "'[ilf the defendant or
those under whom he claims are guilty of a fraud by which the plaintiff
has been debarred or deterred from bringing an action, the period of
limitation shall run only from the time of the plaintiff's discovery of the
fraud. ' " 6° The court held that the statute providing for the tolling of a
cause of action on grounds of fraud had no application to the GDOT's
condemnation proceedings and that the thirty-day time limit for
Cedartown to appeal the estimated compensation could not be tolled per
the statute.61 More specifically, the court held that O.C.G.A. § 32-3-14
"sets forth a mandatory time period for filing an appeal in a condemnation action, not a statute of limitation for commencing a particular type

52. Cedartown, 296 Ga. App. at 54, 673 S.E.2d at 564.
53. Id. at 55, 673 S.E.2d at 564.
54. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 (2007).

55. Cedartown, 296 Ga. App. at 57, 673 S.E.2d at 565.
56. Id. at 55-57, 673 S.E.2d at 564-66.
57. Id. at 55, 673 S.E.2d at 565 (first, second, and fourth alterations in original)
(quoting Chambers v. Dep't of Transp., 172 Ga. App. 197, 197,322 S.E.2d 366,367 (1984)).

58. Id. at 56, 673 S.E.2d at 565.
59. Id. at 57, 673 S.E.2d at 565.
60. Id., 673 S.E.2d at 565-66 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96).
61. Id., 673 S.E.2d at 566.
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of action. As such, by its terms, [O.C.G.A.] § 9-3-96 has no application
here. " 2
B. Property Owners Were Estopped From Contesting the Right to
Condemn Property Because They Withdrew the Money the GDOT
Deposited in the Registry of the Court
In Georgia Department of Transportationv. Bowles,' under O.C.G.A.
§ 32-3-4,' the GDOT filed a condemnation action on April 19, 2001,
against Lynn and Judy Bowles's property. On May 18, 2001, the
Bowleses filed a notice of appeal expressing dissatisfaction with the
estimated amount of compensation. On November 14, 2001, the
Bowleses filed a certification for withdrawal of the funds. An order
condemning the funds was entered on the same date. At the trial to
determine the value of the property, the Bowleses orally moved to
dismiss the condemnation petition because the required appraiser
affidavit was not attested properly. The trial court granted the
motion.'
On appeal, the GDOT asserted under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-11(c)66 that the
Bowles waived any right to challenge the sufficiency of the petition
because they failed to raise the issue within thirty days. 7 The GDOT
also asserted on appeal that the Bowleses were estopped from contesting
the right to condemn the property because they withdrew the money the
GDOT deposited in the registry of the court.'
The court of appeals held that "[piretermitting whether a court may
grant a motion to dismiss a petition made more than [thirty] days after
service for failure to submit a properly attested affidavit, the Bowles[es]
were estopped from challenging the taking because they withdrew the
money deposited in the court registry." 9 The court stated the rule is
that condemnees are estopped from contesting the right to condemn and
70
the validity of the action when they accept payment for the property.
Accepting payment estops condemnees from objecting to "'the condemnation proceedings[,] to the necessity of the taking, or to the validity of the

62. Id.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

292 Ga. App. 829, 666 S.E.2d 92 (2008).
O.C.G.A. § 32-3-4 (2009).
Bowles, 292 Ga. App. at 830, 666 S.E.2d at 93.
O.C.G.A § 32-3-11(c) (2009).
Bowles, 292 Ga. App. at 829, 666 S.E.2d at 93.

68. Id. at 829-30, 666 S.E.2d at 93.
69. Id. at 830, 666 S.E.2d at 93.
70. Id. at 830-31, 666 S.E.2d at 93.
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condemnation proceedings.'"7 1 Thus, condemnees may neither directly
nor indirectly protest the condemnation.72 However, acceptance of
payment does not estop a condemnee from objecting to the amount of
payment so long as the objection is timely pursued.73 As such, the
court held that the trial court erred by dismissing the GDOT's petition
and thus, reversed the trial court.74
C. The Condemnor Cannot Dismiss a Condemnation Action and
Demand Return of the Previously Paid Award
5
In Gramm v. City of Stockbridge,"
the City of Stockbridge filed a
petition for condemnation before a special master under O.C.G.A. § 22-210276 and the Urban Redevelopment Law77 to acquire certain property
owned by Marilyn Gramm for use in the city's redevelopment plan. The
special master granted the city's petition and awarded Gramm $430,000
as the value of the condemned property. The trial court entered a
judgment incorporating the special master's award. After the city paid
the amount awarded into the court's registry, the funds were disbursed
to Gramm. Gramm filed a timely appeal in the trial court to challenge
the amount of the award and asked for a jury trial on the issue.78
However, the city determined it no longer needed Gramm's property
for its redevelopment plan and voluntarily dismissed the condemnation
action without prejudice. The city filed a quitclaim deed reconveying the
property to Gramm and filed a claim of lien seeking Gramm's repayment
of the condemnation award plus interest at a rate of seven percent per
annum. Gramm filed a motion to set aside the city's dismissal of the
condemnation action, which the trial court denied.79 The court of
appeals granted Gramm's application for interlocutory appeal.80
The court of appeals held that title to the property at issue vested in
the city on January 19, 2006, upon the superior court's entry of the
condemnation judgment and the payment of the award to Gramm."'
Therefore, the court held that the city did not have the authority to

71. Id. at 831, 666 S.E.2d at 93 (quoting Fulton County v. Threatt, 210 Ga. App. 266,
267, 435 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1993)).
72. Id.
73. Id., 666 S.E.2d at 93-94.
74. Id., 666 S.E.2d at 94.
75. 297 Ga. App. 165, 676 S.E.2d 818 (2009).
76. O.C.G.A. § 22-2-102 (1982 & Supp. 2009).
77. O.C.G.A. § 36-61-1 to -19 (2006).
78. Gramm, 297 Ga. App. at 165, 676 S.E.2d at 819.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 166, 676 S.E.2d at 820.
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unilaterally dismiss the condemnation action and demand return of the
previously paid award.8 2
The court of appeals also noted that strong countervailing policy
considerations existed to prohibit the city from setting aside the
condemnation judgment.' The court reasoned that O.C.G.A. § 22-2107(g)" was significant because the statute "provides that 'upon the
payment of the amount awarded by the special master into the registry
of the court, the award of the special master and the judgment of the
court condemning the property or interest to the use of the condemning
body shall be conclusive.'"' Thus, "after a condemnation judgment has
been entered, '[tihe condemnor can[notl assent to the judgment adopting
the master's findings, pay in its money and seek to take possession of
the property, and then disown the very property it has paid for, and
sought possession of' in the action." 6 The court of appeals noted that
property owners "should not be required to retain funds paid pursuant
to a condemnation award until such time as the condemnor determines
whether it actually 'needs' or can develop property it has already
acquired."87 A requirement like that would cause prolonged uncertainty and would be inequitable to property owners in condemnation
actions."
D. Property Owners Should Have Been Allowed to Impeach the
GDOT Appraiser's Trial Testimony With His Inconsistent Pretrial
Estimate of Just and Adequate Compensation
In Steele v. Department of Transportation,9 the GDOT filed a
condemnation petition seeking acquisition of "fee simple title to 0.653
acres of land and a construction-and-maintenance easement in 0.028
acres of land within a 2.365-acre tract owned by Thomas Jerry Steele
and others" (collectively, Steele).9 The GDOT paid $154,050 into the
court registry as an estimate of the just and adequate compensation due
to Steele, and Steele appealed to the trial court. The jury returned a

82. Id.
83. See id., 676 S.E.2d at 819-20.
84. O.C.G.A. § 22-2-107(g) (1982 & Supp. 2009).

85. Gramm, 297 Ga. App. at 166, 676 S.E.2d at 819 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 22-2-107(g)).
86. Id., 676 S.E.2d at 819-20 (alterations in original) (quoting Johnson v. Fulton
County, 103 Ga. App. 873, 878-79, 121 S.E.2d 54, 59 (1961)).
87. Id. at 168, 676 S.E.2d at 821.

88. Id.
89. 295 Ga. App. 244, 671 S.E.2d 275 (2008).
90. Id. at 244, 671 S.E.2d at 276.

2009]

ZONING AND LAND USE

437

verdict for Steele and awarded $308,000 as just and adequate compensation. Steele then appealed to the court of appeals.91
The first issue presented on appeal was whether the trial court erred
by barring Steele from using the GDOT appraiser's inconsistencies
between his pretrial affidavit and trial testimony for impeachment
purposes.' The court of appeals held that the trial court prejudicially
erred in refusing to allow Steele to impeach the GDOT appraiser's trial
testimony with his pretrial estimate of just and adequate compensation. 3 The court noted that Steele's expert appraiser estimated just
and adequate compensation at $584,135 and that the jury might have
rendered a verdict closer to that estimate if the trial court had allowed
Steele to impeach the GDOT's expert appraiser "by showing the wide
disparity in his $154,050 and $288,600 compensation estimates before
and at trial.9 4
Steele also argued that the trial court erred by placing limitations on
Steele's "ability to prove cost to cure damages."9 5 The court of appeals
held that the trial court did not err in refusing to allow Steele to claim
cost to cure as a separate element of damages because Steele was
allowed to show how the cost to cure adversely affected the value of the
remaining property.96 Finally, because Steele made no offer of proof
concerning how a reduction in allowable building space for the remaining property affected its value, the court held that the trial court did not
err in refusing to allow Steele to prove consequential damages by
showing that the taking reduced the allowable building space on the
remaining property.97
E. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Allowing the GDOT's Expert
Appraiser to Testify as to the Net Value of the Taking When
Temporary Easements Ultimately Benefited the Property Owner
In Bulgin v. Georgia Department of Transportation,8 the GDOT
condemned land for a highway expansion. A White County, Georgia jury
awarded the property owners $12,600 as just and adequate compensa-

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 246, 671 S.E.2d at 277.
Id. at 247, 671 S.E.2d at 278.
Id., 671 S.E.2d at 277-78.
Id., 671 S.E.2d at 278.
Id. at 248, 671 S.E.2d at 278.
Id., 671 S.E.2d at 278-79.
292 Ga. App. 1, 663 S.E.2d 730 (2008).
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tion for the condemned property. The property owner appealed the
amount of the award."
On appeal, the property owner asserted, among other things, that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to strike the testimony of the
GDOT's real estate appraiser. The appraiser testified that he assessed
the appropriate compensation for the 0.072 acres of condemned property
at $12,600 and that he did not include any compensation for two
temporary easements for the contractor to build a new driveway and a
new fence for the property owner. The appraiser explained these
improvements were for the property owner's use and benefit, and the
temporary loss of use was offset by the improvements. The property
owner argued the appraiser's testimony should have been stricken
because he did not value all interests taken and because he improperly
offset benefits against the value of the taking."°
Recognizing first that the trial court has broad latitude in admitting
expert opinion testimony, the court of appeals further noted that the
Georgia "Supreme Court has recognized that '[ilf the taking of a
temporary easement can be shown by competent evidence to have
diminished the fair market value of the land not taken, the owner is
entitled to just and adequate compensation.'"' 1
Consequently, if it
can be adduced that the taking of a temporary easement diminished the
fair market value, competent evidence should be admissible to establish
0 2
that the temporary taking does not diminish the fair market value.
Under the circumstances of this case, the court of appeals held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to strike the appraiser's
testimony.103
F The Trial Court Misstated the Correct Test for Business Loss
Damages in a Condemnation Case and Improperly Heightened the
Burden for Showing Uniqueness
In ABM Realty Co. v. Board of Regents of the University System of
Georgia,"° the State's university system filed a condemnation action
to take real property containing an office building. ABM Realty
Company, a tenant in the building, operated a business acting as the
building property manager and leasing agent for the owners. ABM

99. Id. at 1, 663 S.E.2d at 731.
100. Id. at 3, 663 S.E.2d at 733.
101. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Dep't of Transp. v. Edwards, 267 Ga. 733, 737,
482 S.E.2d 260, 264 (1997)).
102. Id. at 3-4, 663 S.E.2d at 733.
103. Id. at 4, 663 S.E.2d at 733.
104. 296 Ga. App. 658, 675 S.E.2d 549 (2009).
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intervened in the condemnation action and sought business loss damages
as a result of the university system's complete condemnation of the
building. 0 5
The trial court appointed a special master who awarded ABM $5000
to compensate the loss of its business interest. ABM appealed to the
trial court, and a jury found that ABM lacked the requisite uniqueness
necessary to recover business loss damages in a condemnation action.
ABM appealed and argued that the trial court erred in its jury
instructions." e
On appeal, the court of appeals first noted that when businesses in
condemnation actions belong to a lessee other than the property owner,
the lessee can recover for business losses."° Such recovery is an
"element of compensation separate from the value of the land whether
the destruction of his business is total or merely partial, provided only
that the loss is not remote or speculative. In either event, business losses
are recoverable as a separate item only if the property is unique."'
The court then explained the three methods used to demonstrate the
unique character of property for business loss purposes: (1) "'[i]f the
property must be duplicated for the business to survive, and if there is
no substantially comparable property within the area, then the loss of
the forced seller is such that market value does not represent just and
adequate compensation'"; ° (2) looking to whether the property has "a
value particular to the owner incapable of being passed to a third
party"; ° or (3) recognizing that "unique properties are generally not
of a type bought or sold on the open market" so that there is no market
value in the ordinary sense of the term because there is no willing buyer
and seller."' The court noted that "[o]nly one of the three criteria
need be satisfied in order to authorize recovery of business loss
damage."12

On appeal, ABM focused on the trial court's charge to the jury
concerning the first method of demonstrating uniqueness: whether there

105. Id. at 659, 675 S.E.2d at 551.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dep't of Transp. v. Dixie Highway
Bottle Shop, Inc., 245 Ga. 314, 314, 265 S.E.2d 10, 10 (1980)).
109. Id. (quoting Hous. Auth. of Atlanta v. Troncalli, 111 Ga. App. 515, 518, 142 S.E.2d
93, 95 (1965)).
110. Id. at 660,675 S.E.2d at 551 (citing City of Gainesville v. Chambers, 118 Ga. App.
25, 27, 162 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1968)).
111. Id., 675 S.E.2d at 551-52 (citing Dep't of Transp. v. E. Oil Co., 149 Ga. App. 504,
505, 254 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1979)).
112. Id., 675 S.E.2d at 552.
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is a substantially comparable property within the area. n 3 The court
of appeals noted that under this "locality rule," the specific locale is part
of the test.1 14 Thus, the court reversed the trial court's judgment
because the trial court improperly instructed the jury that the difficulty
relocating the business in the same general area was not a test for
uniqueness when evaluating business loss.115 In so holding, the court
distinguished Almond v. M.A.R.TA 6 because that case involved the
uniqueness of only the real estate, and not of a business in relation to
the location of the building. 7 The court noted that the error was not
harmless because evidence was presented regarding the difficulty of
relocating the business to a comparable site in the area."'
G. The County Could Regulate and Control Access, But it Could Not
Cut Off All Access to a Public Road Without Paying Just and
Adequate Compensationfor Such Inverse Condemnation
In Cobb County v. Annox Self Storage # 1, LLC," 9 the GDOT
acquired, by condemnation, property located at the corner of Cumberland
Parkway and Paces Ferry Road for a road widening project along 1-285.
During the construction project, vehicles used an existing driveway to
enter and exit the property on Cumberland Parkway. In 2004 the
GDOT offered the remaining property for sale to the highest bidder.
Annox Self Storage #1, LLC took title to the property by quitclaim deed,
with construction and easement rights over a portion of the property
reserved for the GDOT. 2 °
Annox submitted its development plans to the director of the Cobb
County Department of Transportation, which approved the site plans
with a "'right in only access'" on Cumberland Parkway.' 2 ' Annox
ultimately filed an application with the Cobb County Board of Commissioners to grant a right of egress on Cumberland Parkway. The board
denied Annox's request. Annox appealed to the trial court and argued
that the board's refusal to permit access to and from its property
constituted an inverse taking. The trial court granted partial summary

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id. at 661, 675 S.E.2d at 552.
Id.
161 Ga. App. 363, 288 S.E.2d 129 (1982).
ABM Realty Co., 296 Ga. App. at 661-62, 675 S.E.2d at 552-53.
Id. at 661, 675 S.E.2d at 552.
294 Ga. App. 218, 668 S.E.2d 851 (2008).
Id. at 218-19, 668 S.E.2d at 852-53.
Id. at 219, 668 S.E.2d at 853 (alteration in original).
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judgment to Annox. Cobb County applied to the court of appeals for
discretionary review."'
The court of appeals held that Annox had a right of access to and from
Cumberland Parkway and that Cobb County could regulate and control
such access pursuant to its police power, but the county could not cut off
all access without paying just and adequate compensation to the
property owner.'
The court determined that the GDOT acquired the
property and its access rights from a third party, conveyed all of its
rights in the property to Annox in fee simple, and retained only a
maintenance and construction easement along Paces Ferry Road."24
Thus, Annox owned the property in fee simple and had access rights to
it." 2
Accordingly, the court held Annox was not required to sue
neighboring property owners for a private right-of-way because it
appealed to the trial court from the adverse decision of the board.' 26
III. NUISANCE AND TRESPASS
During this survey period, the nuisance and trespass jurisprudence of
the Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia Court of Appeals focused on
when liability exists for a nuisance or a trespass, the award of punitive
damages for failure to remedy claims of nuisance and trespass, and a
private road as public nuisance and trespass on an adjoining, private
roadway. Finally, the supreme court also reversed a case from last year
distinguishing a permanent nuisance from a continuing nuisance.
A. The Exercise of Dominion and Control Leads to Liability for
Nuisance
In City of Atlanta v. HofrichterlStiakakis,127 Hofrichter purchased
a house in Atlanta in 1985 without knowledge of an underground storm
drainage pipe that traversed the property. The pipe was connected to
a catch basin on her street and drained storm and surface water from
the street into a ditch at the edge of Hofrichter's property. At some
point in 1996 or 1997, Hofrichter noticed flooding in the street and on
her property caused by clogging of the catch basin, which was cleaned
after she reported it to the city. Hofrichter again complained of flooding
in October 1998, and the city discovered a ruptured pipe, which was

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 219-20, 668 S.E.2d at 853.
Id. at 221, 668 S.E.2d at 854.
Id.
Id.
Id., 668 S.E.2d at 854-55.
291 Ga. App. 883, 663 S.E.2d 379 (2008).

442

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

fixed during two or three visits to the property. Additionally, the city
responded to a problem with the pipe in 2000."
Early in 2002 Hofrichter noticed a geyser in her yard that shot red
clay into the air and was flooding her property and her home. During
an investigation by a waste water collection specialist, it was recommended that the city perform a dye test to determine if there was a
problem with the pipe. However, shortly after this investigation, the city
determined it did not have a storm water easement for the property and
took the position that it was not responsible for the pipe. Despite the
city's position, a few months later another specialist inspected the
property and the flooded part of the yard. The specialist recommended
that the city inspect the pipe with a closed circuit camera, but the city
chose not to do so at that time. Instead, the city repaired portions of the
pipe; however, more flooding occurred, which led Hofrichter to file
additional complaints. Ultimately, the city replaced the entire pipe in
August 2005, allegedly to prevent the storm line from rupturing and
compromising the integrity of the sanitary sewer system."
Hofrichter's property, house, and yard incurred extensive damage,
which included the accumulation of trash in her yard and ants and rats
in her home. Hofrichter also started to suffer from migraines due to
mold growth in her house. She moved out of the property in January
2005 and sold it in November 2006 for $130,000 below the fair market
value. Hofrichter filed this action for the city's failure to maintain the
storm pipe and for the damages caused by the flooding of her property
and home. 130 The trial court found that the subject pipe was part of
the city's storm water system pursuant to Atlanta City Ordinance 74428 1 ' and that the city was responsible for its proper functioning. In
addition, the city was estopped from denying liability because it used the
pipe for its own benefit, undertook to maintain and repair it, and never
disclaimed responsibility until the lawsuit.132 The trial court awarded
Hofrichter a3 total of $510,376 in damages and $325,148 for attorney fees
13
and

costs.

On appeal, the city argued that the trial court erred in deciding it had
dominion and control over the pipe to the extent it could be responsible
for continued maintenance and for creation and maintenance of a

128. Id. at 884, 663 S.E.2d at 381-82.
129. Id. at 884-85, 663 S.E.2d at 382.
130. Id. at 885, 663 S.E.2d at 382.
131. ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 74-428 (Municode through June 10, 2009).
132. Hofrichter, 291 Ga. App. at 885-86, 663 S.E.2d at 382.
133. Id. at 883, 663 S.E.2d at 381.
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nuisance."'
The court of appeals determined that the alternative
rationale of the trial court was a sufficient reason to affirm its order
because the city's actions to maintain the drainage pipe created liability
for its flooding.1 35 Further, the court noted that ownership of the
property that caused the nuisance is not required because "'the exercise
of dominion or control over the property causing the harm is sufficient.'"'136 The city again argued it had maintained its position at all
times that the pipe was a private structure over which it had no control
due to the absence of an easement. 137 However, the record clearly
showed that the city maintained the pipe for over seven years, including
completely replacing the pipe."
In addition, the court noted that the city knew or should have known
as early as 2002 that the pipe was damaged or deteriorated, but it failed
to take the recommendations of its own employees to do a dye test or use
a closed circuit camera.'39 City officials also acknowledged that the
pipe on Hofrichter's property carried water from a city street via a catch
basin which was owned and maintained by the city."4 The court of
appeals disagreed with the city's argument that the trial court erred in
awarding attorney fees because there was no evidence that it acted in
bad faith.14 ' The court held that the city was liable for attorney fees
because it did not maintain the drainage pipe despite knowledge of the
tendency of the pipe to cause flooding on Hofrichter's property.'42
Moreover, the city ignored recommendations from its employees, failed
to disclaim responsibility at any time, and denied responsibility only
when the instant suit was filed.1 43 Thus, the court concluded there
was evidence to support the trial court's finding that the city acted in
bad faith.'
Further, the court noted that there was adequate evidence to show that
the attorney fees charged by Hofrichter's counsel
45
were reasonable.1

134. Id. at 886, 663 S.E.2d at 382-83.
135. Id., 663 S.E.2d at 383.
136. Id. (quoting City of Columbus v. Barngrover, 250 Ga. App. 589, 592, 552 S.E.2d
536, 540 (2001)).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 887, 663 S.E.2d at 384.
140. Id. at 888, 663 S.E.2d at 384.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 889, 663 S.E.2d at 384-85.
144. Id., 663 S.E.2d at 385.
145. Id. at 890, 663 S.E.2d at 385.
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Finally, the city argued that the compensatory damage award of
$300,000 was excessive and thus should be set aside.14 6 However, the
court noted that in a nuisance action, the plaintiff may recover for both
damage to person and damage to property.14

There was also evidence

that Hofrichter suffered special damages for the loss of personal
property, diminution of her property, and rental expenses for being
forced to move from her home.1" Further, she spent over seven years
battling sinkholes, flooding, rats, insects, and mold which caused her to
experience migraines. 149 Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment
for Hofrichter and the awards for damages, costs, and attorney fees."W
B.

PrivateRoad as Public Nuisance
In City of College Park v. 2600 Camp Creek, LLC,' 5 ' the court of
appeals reversed a grant of summary judgment to Camp Creek when the
city appealed a finding that a private access road was a public nuisance.152 The facts in the underlying case, viewed in the light most
favorable to the city, showed that Frontage Road connected two other
streets and provided the only access to Wynterbrook Apartments. Camp
Creek owned the portion of Frontage Road that adjoined its apartment
complex. The road was used by residents, guests, emergency vehicles,
and the general public.153

Several problems with Frontage Road led to the city's initiation of the
action. Numerous potholes, uneven surfaces, broken cement, and other
structural defects caused the city to allege the road was a public
nuisance. In addition, the city's police chief found the condition of the
road inhibitive to emergency vehicles traveling to provide emergency
services. The fire marshal also stated that large fire trucks were forced
to travel at slower rates of speed, which could lead to critical delays
when responding to fires. Moreover, the evidence showed that the
residents of Wynterbrook were in particular need of police and fire
services because the low occupancy rate of the complex made it
attractive to the homeless, gangs, drug activity, and crime. 1"

146.
147.

Id.
Id.

148. Id., 663 S.E.2d at 386.
149. Id. at 891, 663 S.E.2d at 386.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
293 Ga. App. 207, 666 S.E.2d 607 (2008).
Id. at 207, 666 S.E.2d at 607.
Id. at 208, 666 S.E.2d at 608.

154. Id. at 208-09, 666 S.E.2d at 608.

2009]

ZONING AND LAND USE

445

During its review of the grant of summary judgment, the court of
appeals explained that a public nuisance is "'one which damages all
persons who come within the sphere of its operation, though it may vary
in its effects on individuals. ' " " Based on the facts in the record, the
court concluded it was possible a trier of fact could determine that the
condition of the road impeded the necessary provision of emergency
services. 1" The court stated that if there is a significant interference
with the public's health, safety, peace, comfort, or convenience, there
may be a finding of a public nuisance. 57 The court held there was no
merit in the argument by Camp Creek that the road could not be a
public nuisance because it was located on private property." Because
both residents and visitors to Wynterbrook were likely to be affected by
the condition of the road, the court reversed the grant of summary
judgment to Camp Creek. 9
C.

Surface Water Invasion as PermanentNuisance
In City of Atlanta v. Kleber,'" Scott Kleber and Nancy Habif purchased a home that began to experience substantial flood damage during
heavy rains. They brought a nuisance and negligence action against
Norfolk Southern Corporation and the City of Atlanta, which was
appealed last year to the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed
the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Norfolk and the city,
holding that the nuisance complained of by the homeowners was
continuing in nature and that the homeowners' claims were not barred
by the four-year statute of limitations. 6 ' However, the supreme court
granted certiorari to consider two issues:
(1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the
homeowners presented triable issues with respect to their negligence
and nuisance claims against Norfolk and (2) whether the Court of
Appeals erred in concluding that the homeowners presented a triable
issue with respect to their nuisance claim against the City."
The evidence from the trial court showed that Norfolk installed
railroad tracks next to the property at issue in the late 1800s, and at
least four decades ago, it installed a thirty-six-inch drainage pipe and
155. Id. at 209, 666 S.E.2d at 608 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 41-1-2 (1997)).
156. Id.
157. Id.

158. Id., 666 S.E.2d at 609.
159. Id. at 210, 666 S.E.2d at 609.
160. 285 Ga. 413, 677 S.E.2d 134 (2009).
161. Id. at 413-14, 677 S.E.2d at 135.

162. Id. at 414, 677 S.E.2d at 135.
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culvert under the tracks. The pipe and culvert were properly maintained over the years and were clean of debris, intact, and in working
order. In addition, the city placed a connecting pipe onto Norfolk's pipe
to direct runoff to a combined sewer overflow culvert. Kleber and Habif
purchased the home in 1997 and experienced flooding during heavy
rains. They contacted both Norfolk and the city for months about the
problem, but it was not until 2003 that they incurred substantial
property damage that led to the filing of a lawsuit after both Norfolk and
the city refused to fix the flooding problem."
During the litigation, the parties agreed to be bound by the findings
of a court-appointed special master. The special master found that the
property was prone to flooding because Norfolk's pipe was not large
enough to empty the basin without creating ponding or a backup in the
basin. However, the special master noted that the thirty-six-inch pipe
was maintained properly and that it was probably appropriately sized
to accommodate the flow of storm water at the time it was installed.
Additionally, the special master determined that the city's connection to
Norfolk's pipe did not create an increase of storm water that backed up
onto the homeowners' property. Instead, the development of surrounding
properties likely led to the increase of impervious surfaces, which added
to the runoff flowing into the basin.'
The supreme court first reviewed the determination that the nuisance
was wholly continuing in nature." The court pointed out that to be
a permanent nuisance, it must have been the mere presence of the pipe
that created a nuisance due to improper installation; however, a
continuing nuisance is one that was not properly maintained. 16' The
court held that the only nuisance claim the homeowners could bring was
a continuing nuisance claim for improper maintenance within the
preceding four years.167 However, the court then determined that the
homeowners failed to present a triable issue with respect to their
negligence and nuisance claims because all the evidence and findings
showed that the pipe was properly installed and maintained.' 68 The
court also noted there were no triable issues of fact as to the nuisance
claim against the city because the special master found that the city's
connecting pipe did not contribute to the flooding. 1 9 The homeowners
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Id., 677 S.E.2d
Id. at 415, 677
Id.
Id. at 416, 677
Id. at 417, 677
Id., 677 S.E.2d
Id. at 418, 677

at 135-36.
S.E.2d at 136.
S.E.2d at 137.
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S.E.2d at 138.
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also argued the city created a nuisance by approving construction
permits for the development of the surrounding property, but this
argument was unsuccessful. 7 ° The court concluded that the record did
not present any actions by the city that demonstrated control over the
property in question or an acceptance of a dedication of the property;
thus, the city could not be held responsible for maintaining the railroad's
culvert.'
Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the court of
appeals.'7 2
Two justices dissented from the majority opinion, agreeing with the
court of appeals that the claims were not barred by the statute of
limitations." 3
The dissent noted that the majority changed the
traditional rule in classifying a permanent or a continuing nuisance; the
traditional rule in the supreme court and below was that a continuing
nuisance is one that can be classified as transient and abatable.'74
The dissent pointed out that the special master found the flooding could
be alleviated by the construction of an additional drainage pipe on
Norfolk's property or the widening of the existing pipe, so the dissent
determined that the majority incorrectly classified the nuisance as
permanent when it was continuing. 7 The dissent believed a genuine
issue of material fact existed as to whether Norfolk's drainage pipe
caused the damage to the homeowners' property because the special
master found that the thirty-six-inch pipe was not large enough to empty
the basin without a backup of storm water.'76 The dissent also noted
that the special master found that the surrounding development could
have generated additional water runoff, which should have created a
causation question for the jury; thus, the dissent would have affirmed
1 77
the court of appeals decision.
D.

No Nuisance or Trespass if Express Easement Exists

In DeSarno v. Jam Golf Management, LLC,1 71 James and Susan
DeSarno filed a lawsuit for injunctive relief against the owners and
operators of a golf course. The golf course was developed in 1999, and
at that time an easement was entered into that permitted golf balls to
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be hit onto the neighboring lots and allowed golfers to enter the lots to
retrieve errant golf balls at reasonable times. The easement also
relieved the golf course owner from liability for damage or injury
resulting from errant golf balls.'79
In 2003 the DeSarnos decided to build a home on one of the neighboring lots. Initially, the husband was a member of the golf course and
played the course approximately fifteen to twenty times. As more time
passed, the golf course's business substantially increased until about
30,000 rounds of golf were played annually. As a result, the DeSarnos
experienced a dramatic increase in the number of errant golf balls,
receiving about ten to fifteen balls a day. They sustained twenty-three
broken windows, twenty-six chips or breaks on the siding of their house,
two dents in their vehicle, broken lights, and near misses with their
children."
The DeSarnos' suit was based on claims of trespass and nuisance
arising from the errant golf balls. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. 8' On appeal, the court of
appeals decided the easement explicitly permitted such activity to take
place on the DeSarnos' property, and it exonerated the golf course owner
82
from any liability."
Therefore, no claim for nuisance or trespass
could be maintained."8
The court relied on the rule that "[anexpress easement permitting
conduct that would otherwise constitute trespass or nuisance precludes
such claims by the owner of the servient estate against the owner or4
legal occupant of the dominant estate for engaging in such conduct."'8
The DeSarnos argued the increase in golf balls constituted an excessive
use of the easement, creating a nuisance; however, the court rejected
that argument because it implied a use that exceeded the scope of the
easement or was intended to benefit a property other than the dominant
estate." Therefore, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the defendants because the easement expressly permitted the
offensive conduct."
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E. The Failureto Remedy Nuisance and Trespass Leads to Punitive
Damages
In Wildcat Cliffs Builders, LLC v. Hagwood,"8 ' Wildcat Cliffs
Builders appealed the trial court's award of punitive damages and
attorney fees to Ed Hagwood in Hagwood's trespass and nuisance case
against Wildcat. Wildcat's owner, Mark Rudolph, developed a portion
of the Wildcat Lakes subdivision, including Lot 73, and the back of Lot
73 adjoined property owned by Hagwood. For Wildcat to grade Lot 73,
Rudolph needed to grade a portion of Hagwood's property. He contacted
Hagwood on several occasions about purchasing some of the property.
Hagwood explained to Rudolph that he had no interest in selling, so
Wildcat proceeded with the grading and building of two concrete
retaining walls on what Wildcat believed was the rear of Lot 73.
However, the grading contractor graded a portion of Hagwood's property,
taking down approximately forty-one old-growth hardwood trees in the
process and building portions of the retaining walls on Hagwood's
property. Wildcat offered to pay Hagwood $10,000 for an easement on
his property if he would assume liability arising from the retaining
walls, but Hagwood rejected the offer."s
After the grading and construction of the retaining walls, Hagwood
experienced severe problems with run-off and erosion, which led to large
pools of water and mud rushing into the streets, causing neighbors to
complain. Hagwood filed suit because Wildcat did nothing to remedy or
ameliorate these problems. The jury awarded Hagwood both compensa89
tory and punitive damages, as well as attorney fees and costs.

On appeal, the question was whether the evidence supported a finding
of "conscious indifference to consequences," which would justify punitive
damages under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(b).' 9 The court cited a case with
similar facts wherein the supreme court held that "such a conscious
indifference to consequences may exist where a party creates a nuisance
that causes a runoff of water and silt onto or from another's property,
and thereafter fails to ameliorate or remedy the same."'9 1 In the
instant case, the court of appeals held that the facts supported the jury's
award of punitive damages because when Wildcat created the problem

187. 292 Ga. App. 244, 663 S.E.2d 818 (2008).
188.. Id. at 244-45, 663 S.E.2d at 820.
189. Id. at 245-46, 663 S.E.2d at 820-21.
190. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(b) (2000); Wildcat Cliffs Builders, 292 Ga. App. at 246, 663
S.E.2d at 821.
191. Wildcat Cliffs Builders, 292 Ga. App. at 246, 663 S.E.2d at 821 (citing Tyler v.
Lincoln, 272 Ga. 118, 120-21, 527 S.E.2d 180, 183 (2000)).
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of erosion and run-off, it was put on notice of its conduct and continuing
consequences thereof, and yet it made no effort to remedy the problem.192 In its defense, Wildcat asserted it could not correct the problem without trespassing further on Hagwood's property.193 However,
the court noted there was no evidence Wildcat ever attempted to seek
permission to return to the property to take remedial measures."9 For
these reasons, the court of appeals affirmed the award of punitive
damages and attorney fees.' 95
F

Trespass on Adjoining Private Road

In Warner v. Brown, 9 6 the court of appeals addressed the issue of
whether Scott and Susan Warner were trespassing on Brown's property
or whether they had acquired prescriptive rights to the property.'9 7
The parties owned neighboring lots on Talahi Island in Chatham
County, Georgia, that were separated by a thirty-foot roadway. The
roadway served as a driveway to Brown's property and was originally
part of a single parcel owned by a prior owner, Donald Shearhouse.
Shearhouse's property was bordered by a marsh on the southern end and
a public street on the northern end. He subdivided the lot into two
parcels with one lot fronting the marsh and the other fronting the public
street. 98
Shearhouse then sold the street lot to Hugh and Vivian Holland and
the marsh lot to W.I. and Effie Robinson, and both deeds described the
lots "as being bordered on the east by a 'thirty foot street.' 1' 99 The
Robinsons used the roadway to access the public street while the
Hollands used it for pedestrian access. The families had a close
relationship that was typified by their joint construction of both an
earthen causeway over the roadway that extended across the marsh, as
well as a dock attached to the causeway. Each family
used the
20 0
causeway and dock for approximately forty to fifty years.
In 1991 the Warners were deeded an undeveloped lot directly east of
the roadway and later built a house on it. The Warners obtained
permission from Mrs. Robinson, who at the time owned the property
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Id. at 510-11, 659 S.E.2d at 886.
Id. at 511, 659 S.E.2d at 887.
Id.
Id. at 511-12, 659 S.E.2d at 887.
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jointly with her son, to use the roadway for pedestrian access to the
causeway. The Warners built a dock at the end of the causeway, and
while the dock was located on their property, the only access to it was
over the causeway. Despite permission from Mrs. Robinson to use the
causeway, her son installed a fence to block the Warners' pedestrian
access, and counsel for the Robinsons sent a letter revoking the previous
permission. 2° I
In 1999 the Hollands and the Warners filed suit for access to and use
of the causeway against Brown and Robinson, who jointly owned the
marsh lot by that time. A settlement was reached allowing the Warners
pedestrian access to the causeway, but in 2004 Brown notified the
Warners that their access and use was revoked because they violated the
agreement. The Robinsons' interest in the property was ultimately
deeded solely to Brown. Later, Brown filed the instant action seeking
an injunction to prevent the Warners from accessing or using the
causeway and damages for trespass. Both parties filed motions for
summary judgment, and the trial court granted Brown's motion and
denied the Warners' motion because it found that Brown had valid title
to the roadway.2"2
On appeal, the Warners argued that the chain of title did not support
Brown's claim to the roadway.2 °3 The court of appeals dismissed this
argument because Georgia law operated to convey title to the adjoining
roadway to the grantees and their successors. 2 4 The court noted,
"'When a grantor conveys property as bounded by a road that the
grantor also owns, Georgia courts apply a rule of construction to hold
that the deed conveys the fee interest that the grantor held in the road
unless there is a clear expression of a contrary intent.'" 20 5 There was
no contrary intent expressed in the deed from Shearhouse, so Brown, as
a successor in the interest, had valid title in the roadway.2° Because
Brown owned the property, the court held
that he had the right to
20 7
determine who traveled over it or used it.

201. Id. at 512, 659 S.E.2d at 887.
202. Id. at 512-13, 659 S.E.2d at 888.
203. Id. at 513, 659 S.E.2d at 888.
204. Id.
205. Id. (quoting 1845 La Dawn Lane, LLC v. Bowman, 277 Ga. 741, 742, 594 S.E.2d
373, 374-75 (2004)).
206. Id. at 514, 659 S.E.2d at 888.
207. Id., 659 S.E.2d at 889.
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The Warners also argued that even if Brown owned the roadway, they
obtained prescriptive rights to use it.2"° However, O.C.G.A. § 44-91209 required the Warners to show
(i) that their use of the Roadway was uninterrupted for at least seven
consecutive years; (ii) that they kept the Roadway open and in good
repair during that time; (iii) that their use of the Roadway was adverse
210
. . .;and (iv) that the Roadway was no more than 20 feet wide.
The court noted there was no evidence in the record that the Warners
maintained the roadway. 2 Furthermore, the roadway was wider than
the twenty-foot maximum required by the statute. 12
In addition, the Warners argued they were given a parol license to use
the roadway and that their license ripened into an easement pursuant
to O.C.GA. § 44-9-4213 based on their expenditure of funds to construct
and maintain their dock.2 14 The court determined this argument
ignored the rule that a licensee's erection of improvements on his own
land with the expectation of enjoying a parol license does not make the
license irrevocable.21 5 Instead, it is an expenditure of funds to improve
the property over which the license was issued or the licensor's property
that would provide support for an easement.2 16 Thus, the court
affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Brown on his trespass claim
and 7 held that he owned the part of the roadway bordering his proper21

ty.

IV.

EASEMENTS AND RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

During the survey period, in the context of restrictive covenants, the
appellate courts addressed (1) whether restrictive covenants disqualified
property from current use assessment as "bona fide conservation use"
land and (2) whether an access easement could be used to add a
restrictive term to a fee simple warranty deed for an adjacent property.
In the context of easements, the courts analyzed access easement rights,

208. Id. at 515, 659 S.E.2d at 889.
209. O.C.G.A. § 44-9-1 (1982).
210. Warner, 290 Ga. App. at 515, 659 S.E.2d at 889-90.

211. Id. at 515-16, 659 S.E.2d at 890.
212. Id. at 516, 659 S.E.2d at 890.
213. O.C.G.A. § 44-9-4 (2002).
214. Warner, 290 Ga. App. at 515-16, 659 S.E.2d at 890.
215. Id. at 516, 659 S.E.2d at 890 (citing Decker Car Wash, Inc. v. BP Prods. N.
America, Inc., 286 Ga. App. 263, 266, 649 S.E.2d 317, 320 (2007)).

216. Id. (citing Cox v. Zucker, 214 Ga. 44, 51-52, 102 S.E.2d 580, 585 (1958)).
217. Id. at 517, 659 S.E.2d at 890.
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abandonment of easement rights, and whether a parol license had
ripened into an irrevocable easement running with the land.
A. Restrictive Covenants Prevented Property From QualifyingAs
"Bona Fide Conservation Use" Under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4
2 15 the issue on appeal was whether the
In Morrison v. Claborn,
Jasper County Board of Tax Assessors properly determined that David
Morrison's three parcels of agricultural property did not qualify as "bona
fide conservation use" under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4219 when restrictive
covenants prevented the property owner from conducting some, but not
all, of the activities described in O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4(a)(1)(E). 220 In two
previous years, Morrison's three properties were approved by the board
as bona fide conservation use properties eligible for current use
Morrison's properties were subjected to restrictive
assessment.
covenants prohibiting poultry and swine operations at the time of the
initial and continuation applications. After a county-wide audit in 2006,
the board discovered Morrison's properties were subject to the restrictive
covenants and voted to remove the conservation221use designation and the
current use assessment from those properties.
The board relied on O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4(b)(5) to remove the current use
assessment.22 2 At the time, the statute provided that "[n]o property
shall qualify as bona fide conservation use property if such property is
at the time of application for current use assessment subject to a
restrictive covenant which prohibits the use of the property for any
223
purpose described in subparagraph (a)(1)(E) of this Code section."
Resolution of the issue turned on the meaning of the word any, because
the restrictive covenants on Morrison's properties prohibited him from
conducting some, though not all, of the activities described in O.C.G.A.
§ 48-5-7.4(a)(1)(E).224

218. 294 Ga. App. 508, 669 S.E.2d 492 (2008).
219. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4 (1999 & Supp. 2009). Under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4, owners of
"bona fide conservation use property," including property used for certain agricultural
purposes and that meets other statutory criteria and conditions, may apply to the county
board of tax assessors for "current use assessment" of their property for the purposes of
calculating ad valorem taxes. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4(j). A tax savings is realized because
property is assessed at forty percent of its "current use value" instead of forty percent of
its "fair market value." Morrison, 294 Ga. App. at 509 n.1, 669 S.E.2d at 493 n.1.
220. Morrison, 294 Ga. App. at 508-09, 669 S.E.2d at 493.
221. Id. at 509-10, 669 S.E.2d at 493-94.
222. Id. at 511, 669 S.E.2d at 495.
223. O.C.G.A § 48-5-7.4(bX5) (1999) (amended 2008).
224. Morrison, 294 Ga. App. at 511-12, 669 S.E.2d at 495.
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The court noted it is well-established in Georgia that laws granting
tax exemptions must be construed strictly in favor of the authority
imposing the tax.225 This rule required the court to construe any
ambiguity in favor of the board.226 In addition, the provision at issue
would amount to mere surplusage if the court adopted Morrison's
interpretation.2 27 The court stated that "[i]f property is disqualified
from eligibility as bona fide conservation use property only if a
restrictive covenant bars all of the conceivable qualifying uses within the
scope of [O.C.G.A.] § 48-5-7.4(a)(1)(E), a restrictive covenant would
rarely, if ever, violate [O.C.G.A.] § 48-5-7.4(b)(5), and that subsection
would serve little or no purpose."2" Thus, the court concluded that
this type of property, with a restrictive covenant prohibiting an activity
enumerated in subsection2 (a)(1)(E),
does not qualify as a bona fide
9
conservation use property.
Effective May 14, 2008, the General Assembly amended certain
language in O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4(b)(5).2 3 ° The new language removed
the word any (the definition of which created the issue in Morrison), and
now reads as follows:
No property shall qualify as bona fide conservation use property if such
property is at the time of application for current use assessment
subject to a restrictive covenant which prohibits the use of the property
for the specific purpose described in subparagraph (a)(1)(E) of this Code
section for which bona fide conservation use qualification is sought."'
B. An Access Easement Could Not Be Used to Add a Restrictive Term
to a Fee Simple Warranty Deed
In White House Inn & Suites, Inc. v. City of Warm Springs,232 a
property owner who deeded the city a parcel for the construction of a
water tower, as well as an easement over the owner's property for access
to the tower, brought an action to enjoin the city from using the site for

225. Id. at 512, 669 S.E.2d at 495 (citing Ethicon, Inc. v. Ga. Dep't of Revenue, 291 Ga.
App. 130, 130, 661 S.E.2d 170, 171 (2008)).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 513, 669 S.E.2d at 496.

228. Id.
229. Id. at 513-14, 669 S.E.2d at 496; see also Jasper County Bd. of Tax Assessors v.
Solomon, 296 Ga. App. 441, 441, 674 S.E.2d 668, 668 (2009).
230. 2008 Ga. Laws 1149, 1149-50.
231. Id. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4(b)(5)).
232. 285 Ga. 322, 676 S.E.2d 178 (2009).
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construction of a radio tower. The trial court denied injunctive relief,
and the property owner appealed. 3
The warranty deeds granted the city fee simple title to property upon
which the city initially built a water tower.'
The language of the
contemporaneously executed easement instrument, entitled "Water and
Sewer Line Easement," stated it was granted "for the purpose of
installing and maintaining utilities ... and for any other purposes
necessary to construct and maintain water and sewer lines."3 5 In
2006 the city entered a contract to allow construction of a radio tower on
the parcel in exchange for certain public safety communications
equipment and services. Attempting to halt operation of the radio tower,
the plaintiff argued the easement clearly restricted the property to a
water tower and related utilities and that the contemporaneously
executed warranty deeds should be construed as similarly restricted.236
The Georgia Supreme Court noted the scope of O.C.G.A. § 24-63(a),2 7-- which authorizes the use of contemporaneously executed
writings to correct obvious errors or provide necessary terms not
contained in the document at issue23 8-did not allow adding to an
agreement a representation or warranty that is not there. 239 The court
held that the easement, though it was contemporaneously executed with
the warranty deeds, could not be used to burden the warranty deeds
with a restrictive use that was not contained therein." ° Furthermore,
the court determined that the stated purpose of the easement was
unambiguous and authorized its use for utility purposes that were not
limited to sewer lines and water.2 "
C. Whether a Parcel is "Landlocked"or Has Access Rights is
Governed by the Deed; The Possibility of Access Through a Private
Right-of-Way Goes to the Issue of Damages
In Cobb County v. Annox Self Storage #1, LLC, 42 the court granted
a discretionary appeal to review the trial court's finding that Annox had
a right of ingress and egress (an access easement) to and from certain

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 322, 676 S.E.2d at 179.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 322-23, 676 S.E.2d at 179.
O.C.G.A. § 24-6-3(a) (1995).
Id.

239. White House Inn & Suites, 285 Ga. at 323, 676 S.E.2d at 179-80.
240. Id., 676 S.E.2d at 180.

241. Id.
242. 294 Ga. App. 218, 668 S.E.2d 851 (2008). For additional discussion of this case,
see supra text accompanying notes 119-26.
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Cobb County
property that Annox owned contiguous to Cumberland
2 3
Parkway. 4

In 2004 Annox purchased approximately one acre of property left over
from a GDOT road-widening project. The deed conveyed all of the
GDOT's rights in the property, including the access rights the GDOT
obtained from the prior owner. Annox submitted plans for the property,
including a proposed entrance and exit configuration, to state and county
department of transportation officials, the county manager, and finally
the Cobb County Board of Commissioners. Each exit proposal was
rejected, supposedly for public safety reasons, and conflicts with the
existing traffic movements. 2 "
Annox appealed to the trial court, asserting that Cobb County took
Annox's property without just compensation by depriving Annox of the
right of access. The county moved for summary judgment, arguing that
Annox's property was landlocked when purchased and that Annox failed
to exhaust its administrative remedies because it did not appeal the
GDOTs denial of egress and did not bring suit against a neighboring
landowner for private right-of-way access rights.245
By well-established law, the court of appeals held that because the
subject property abutted a public road, Annox had a right of access to
and from that public road.2"6 Furthermore, the court concluded that
the county could regulate and control that access pursuant to its police
powers, but it could not cut off all access without having to pay just and
adequate compensation.2 7 The county's argument that the property
was landlocked when purchased by Annox failed because the deed
governed access rights; the deed in this case was not ambiguous in
showing that Annox acquired all rights the GDOT acquired from its
grantor, including the right of access to the abutting public road.248
Finally, the county's argument that Annox failed to exhaust its
administrative remedies was unsuccessful because Annox appealed the
board's decision to the trial court, and the rulings of other agencies were
not at issue.2 9 Whether there were alternative means of access
through a private right-of-way went to the amount of damages due, if
any, for the deprivation of one means of access to the property, but an
alternative means of access did not foreclose altogether the plaintiff's

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

294 Ga. App. at 218, 668 S.E.2d at 852.
Id. at 218-20, 668 S.E.2d at 852-53.
Id. at 220, 668 S.E.2d at 853-54.
Id. at 220-21, 668 S.E.2d at 854.
Id. at 221, 668 S.E.2d at 854.
Id.
Id. at 222, 668 S.E.2d at 854-55.
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right to seek compensation for the county's interference with its existing
right of ingress and egress to the adjoining public road.' 0
D. A ParolLicense Ripened into an Irrevocable Easement Running
With the Land
In Mize v. McGarity,251 lakefront lot owners filed suit against the
owners of adjoining lots, asserting claims for trespass and alleging that
the defendants were improperly interfering with their rights to
easements located on the defendants' property. The properties at issue
consisted of Lots 4, 5, and 6, which were adjoining lakefront properties
at Lake Lanier. In the 1960s the three owners of Lots 4, 5, and 6 agreed
to split the costs of grading and preparing a driveway on Lots 5 and 6,
which they could all use to access their properties from the public road.
At the end of the driveway, the owners installed mailboxes for the three
properties and a gate to which each owner had a key. The owners of
Lots 4 and 5 also jointly built a set of stairs that began on Lot 4 and
ended on Lot 5 to give Lot 4 access to the lake. Finally, the owners
installed concrete parking pads on Lots 4 and 5, which the owners of Lot
4 used as a roadway to access the joint driveway on Lots 5 and 6.252
Eventually, Lots 5 and 6 were sold and consolidated to a single owner.
The respective warranty deeds included language that the conveyances
were made subject to the joint driveway between Lots 5 and 6. However,
the new owner of Lots 5 and 6 subsequently planted trees on Lot 5,
including across the roadway the owners of Lot 4 used to access the joint
driveway. They also removed the concrete steps on Lot 5, which cut off
lake access to the owners of Lot 4. 3
The owners of Lot 4 filed suit asserting easement rights in the joint
driveway on Lots 5 and 6, the roadway on Lot 5, and the location where
the steps had been on Lot 5. The trial court found in favor of the owners
of Lot 4 and granted them the easements they sought pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 44-9-4254 which provides that a parol license to use
another's land "is not revocable when the licensee has acted pursuant
thereto and in so doing has incurred expense; in such case, it becomes
an easement running with the land.""5 Because of the verbal agreement between the initial lot owners and their expenditures to construct
the driveway and concrete pads, the court of appeals affirmed that the

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id., 668 S.E.2d at 855.
293 Ga. App. 714, 667 S.E.2d 695 (2008).
Id. at 714-16, 667 S.E.2d at 697-98.
Id. at 716, 667 S.E.2d at 698.
O.C.G.A. § 44-9-4 (1982); Mize, 293 Ga. App. at 716, 667 S.E.2d at 698.
O.C.GA § 44-9-4; Mize, 293 Ga. App. at 717, 667 S.E.2d at 698.
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owners of Lot 4 had an irrevocable easement in the joint driveway and
roadway.256
The court noted that as subsequent purchasers, the defendants could
only be burdened with the easement if the record showed they had notice
of the easements when they took possession of their properties.25 7 In
this case, the easement was open and observable to any reasonably
prudent person.258 The court noted that the mailboxes, the locked gate
to which the owners of Lot 4 had a key, the stairs descending from Lot
4 to Lot 5, the lack of any other access between Lot 4 and the public
road, and the Lot 4 owner's open use of the driveway and roadway all
evidenced notice of the easements. 259 Finally, the evidence showing
the trees were planted to block use of the driveway constituted a willful
trespass and, thus, supported a finding of bad faith for the recovery of
attorney fees. 6 0
E. No Reciprocal Benefit Evident to Create Quasi-Easement;
Recorded Documents Not Ambiguous, Thus No Easement by
Implication;Improvements Did Not Benefit Licensor's Property and
Thus Did Not Ripen Into IrrevocableEasement
In de Castro v. Durrell,261 a dispute arose over property historically
used as a soccer field on Lot 1 of a subdivision consisting of four
adjoining lots. A twenty-foot strip of the field spanned the rear of Lots
3 and 4.262 Preliminary site plans for the subdivision designated Lot
1 for a soccer field;26' however, the final recorded subdivision plat
showed the twenty-foot strip easement area on Lots 3 and 4, but no
easement area on Lot 1. In addition, the warranty deed to the
purchasers of Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 incorporated a declaration of easement
agreement, which created a "Recreation Easement Area" upon the
twenty-foot strip as a burden on Lots 3 and 4 and for the benefit of Lot
1.264

In 2004 the owners of Lots 1 and 2 ceased allowing the owners of Lots
3 and 4 to access the soccer field and erected a "no trespassing" sign.
The plaintiffs sued, claiming the right to access the disputed land for

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Mize, 293 Ga. App. at 717, 667 S.E.2d at 698-99.
Id. at 718, 667 S.E.2d at 699.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 721, 667 S.E.2d at 701.

261. 295 Ga. App. 194, 671 S.E.2d 244 (2008).
262. Id. at 194-95, 671 S.E.2d at 246.

263. Id. at 195, 671 S.E.2d at 247.
264. Id. at 196, 671 S.E.2d at 247-48.

ZONING AND LAND USE

20091

459

recreational purposes under theories of parol license, prescriptive
easement, estoppel, quasi-easement, and restrictive covenants, among
others. 2" They provided evidence that the property had been publicly
marketed as including a recreational area to be shared by all lot
26
owners. 6
The court of appeals first tackled the quasi-easement claim. 267 A
quasi-easement is an easement implied from a prior existing use and
requires proof that "before the conveyance or transfer severing the unity
of title, the common owner used part of the united parcel for the benefit
of another part, and this use was apparent and obvious, continuous, and
permanent.'"'
However, the court reasoned that the declaration
agreement made clear that no reciprocal benefit was created for the
owners of Lots 3 and 4.269 The court further noted that the concept of
quasi-easement has been applied in Georgia "only in instances where an
implied easement is necessary to provide water or other essential
services to one parcel of property after partition of the tract by the
developer or other common owner."27 0 The court would not expand this
application in the manner argued by the plaintiffs for use of a recreational area.271
The court addressed implied easement, oral restrictive covenant, and
estoppel jointly because these theories are governed by similar principles
of law.27 2 As the plat and declaration agreement were unambiguous
and did not contradict one another, the court could neither entertain
parol evidence nor accept the plaintiffs' arguments that an easement had
arisen by implication on Lot 1.273 Furthermore, the plaintiffs lost on
their theory of an oral restrictive covenant because they purchased their
lots with knowledge of the recorded easement and recorded plat, neither
of which created a recreational easement. 274 The plaintiffs also could
not rely on the unrecorded preliminary plat to claim estoppel, otherwise

265.
266.
267.
268.

Id. at 195, 671 S.E.2d at 246-47.
Id. at 196-97, 671 S.E.2d at 248.
See id. at 198, 671 S.E.2d at 248.
Id., 671 S.E.2d at 249 (quoting Granite Props. Ltd. P'ship v. Manns, 512 N.E.2d

1230, 1236 (fl. 1987)).

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id. at 199, 671 S.E.2d at 249.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 200, 671 S.E.2d at 250.
Id. at 200-01, 671 S.E.2d at 250.
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it would "'unreasonably expand the Georgia law of implied easements,
and would do great harm to the predictability of land titles.'"2 75
Finally, the court considered the argument that a parol license
resulted in an irrevocable easement in favor of the owner of Lot 4.276
The plaintiff provided evidence that he made significant improvements
to the disputed field by redirecting a drain line on his property, rather
than plugging it, during construction of the foundation for his house so
that it would not flood the field on Lot 1, and that he installed sprinklers on his property which also sprayed water onto Lot 1.277 The
court recognized the rule that a "parol license is not revocable when the
licensee has acted pursuant thereto and in so doing has incurred
expense; in such case, it becomes an easement running with the
land." 8 However, the court noted the licensee's enjoyment of the
license must be preceded by an investment that increases the value of
the licensor's land to the licensor.179 In the instant case, the improvements made were essential to enjoyment of the plaintiff's property, and
there was no evidence they enhanced the value of Lot 1." The court
stated that "'[tihe mere fact that a licensee erects improvements upon
his own land and thereby incurs expense in the expectation of enjoying
the license'" is not enough to make the licensee a purchaser for value
1 Thus, the parol license argument failed
and the license irrevocable."
22
law.
of
matter
a
as
F Portion of Easement Extinguished by Nonuse Despite Recorded
Plat and Easement Granted by Deed
In Pleasure Bluff Dock Club, Inc. v. Poston,' homeowners and a
homeowners association sued the Robert and Linda Poston to establish
the parties' easement rights in disputed property. First, certain deeds
granted access to a natural boat ramp on the river. However, the
landing area had not been used since a common dock had been built in
the 1960s, and the marsh eventually filled in the area. Second, a
subdivision plat filed by the original developers designated a 100-foot-

275. Id. at 201-02, 671 S.E.2d at 251 (quoting Eardley v. McGreevy, 279 Ga. 562,564,
615 S.E.2d 744, 746 (2005)).

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id. at 202, 615 S.E.2d at 251.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 202-03, 671 S.E.2d at 252.
Id. at 203, 671 S.E.2d at 252.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cox v. Zucker, 214 Ga. 44, 51, 102 S.E.2d 580,

585 (1958)).

282. Id.
283. 294 Ga. App. 318, 670 S.E.2d 128 (2008).
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wide strip of land running between several lots and the adjacent river's
low water mark as a private road to be known as St. Julington
Boulevard. The developers retained ownership of the boulevard but
granted lot purchasers the right of ingress and egress along the road.
The boulevard was never paved; rather a 9-foot-wide dirt road developed
within the boulevard's original 100-foot expanse. The Postons' two lots
fronted the landing and the boulevard. The Postons obtained quitclaim
deeds from the developers' heirs to the 100-foot-wide section of the
boulevard between their lots and the river to build a private dock.'
A special master found, and the trial court affirmed, that the Postons
had a fee simple interest in the portion of the boulevard that fronted
their property. This was subject to the homeowners' right of ingress and
egress along the approximately 9-foot-wide dirt road that developed in
front of their property, but advanced no further because they never used
more than this section. On appeal, the homeowners argued that because
their original deeds granted them easement rights over the entire width
of the boulevard, those rights could not be lost or extinguished.'
On appeal, the court of appeals analyzed whether an easement
granted by deed, though not lost by non-use alone, may be deemed
abandoned when the evidence demonstrates "'an intent to abandon. ' "'
The court concluded that the easement to the natural boat
ramp had been abandoned because it had not been used in decades and
because residents had allowed the marsh to fill in the landing area."
As for the boulevard, the court noted that although a subdivision plat
"creates a presumption that reasonably necessary use, fair, or reasonable
enjoyment of the easement requires the full use of the right-of-way...
as platted," that presumption may be rebutted.'
In this case,
evidence showed that the 9-foot-wide track adequately provided ingress
and egress because it had been used at that width since the 1960s. 2 9
The homeowners thus retained easement rights over only the 9-foot-wide
dirt road because the rest of the easement across the boulevard was
abandoned.'

284. Id. at 318-19, 670 S.E.2d at 129.
285. Id. at 319-20, 670 S.E.2d at 129.

286. Id. at 320, 670 S.E.2d at 129 (quoting Whipple v. Hatcher, 283 Ga. 309, 310, 658
S.E.2d 585, 586 (2008)).
287. Id., 670 S.E.2d at 129-30.
288. Id., 670 S.E.2d at 130 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Montana v.
Blount, 232 Ga. App. 782, 786, 504 S.E.2d 447, 452 (1998)).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 320-21, 670 S.E.2d at 130.
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V. MISCELLANEOUS

A. Claims Not Redressable When Applications for Sign Permit
Violated Non-Challenged Provisions of the Sign Ordinance
29
In Covenant Media of Georgia, LLC v. City of Lawrenceville, ' an
outdoor advertising company brought suit to challenge an allegedly
unconstitutional sign ordinance. Covenant Media of Georgia, LLC
submitted nine sign applications to the City of Lawrenceville in
February 2007, which were all denied. Covenant Media claimed that the
sign ordinance (1) granted the city unfettered discretion and (2) imposed
an unconstitutional prohibitive fee on expressive activity. The undisputed facts showed that all of the proposed billboards were denied because
they did not conform to various height, size, location, and certification
provisions of the city sign ordinance, and Covenant Media failed to pay
the required application fee.'
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
found that Covenant Media lacked standing because it could not
establish that a favorable decision on its claims would allow it3 to build
All of
its proposed signs-the redressability element of standing.
ordinance
sign
the
of
provisions
violated
applications
Covenant Media's
Covenant did not challenge, and these in no way related to the allegedly
unconstitutional discretionary and fee provisions of the sign ordinance
294 The court reasoned
upon which Covenant Media based its claims.
that even if Covenant Media succeeded in showing the contested
provisions of the ordinance were unconstitutional, other unchallenged
provisions would still prevent the plaintiff from erecting its billboards. 5 Thus, Covenant Media could not show that its federal
constitutional claims were redressable, and therefore, the court lacked
standing to hear the claims.'

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

580 F. Supp. 2d 1313 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
Id. at 1314-16.
Id. at 1317.
Id.
Id. at 1318.
Id.
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B. Lack of 7tme Limit Rendered Sign Ordinance an Unconstitutional
PriorRestraint on Speech
In Roma Outdoor Creations, Inc. v. City of Cumming," Roma
Outdoor Creations, Inc. attempted to secure sign permits and variances
to erect two advertising signs that did not adhere to the requirements
of the City of Cumming's sign ordinance in terms of height, allowable
proximity to other existing signs, and content. The sign ordinance
limited the locations and dimensions of all signs and restricted the
permissible advertising messages to the following: (1) travel service
facilities including gas, food, and camping; (2) areas of scenic beauty; (3)
public attractions; and (4) any combination of the former with directional
content.2 98 The plaintiff claimed that the lack of a time limit in the
ordinance permitted the city to delay processing the plaintiff's applications in violation of equal protection and that the regulation of content
constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.2"
The court found that the plaintiff's first alleged injury-damages
resulting from the city's 154-day processing delay in taking action on the
plaintiff's variance requests-was redressable and could go forward. 00
However, the plaintiff lacked standing to raise First Amendment 30 '
claims arising from the application denials because the applications
failed to conform to the unchallenged height and separation requirements. 0 2 As in Covenant Media, the court followed other recent cases
which have held that a plaintiff challenging a sign ordinance cannot
demonstrate redressability if the plaintiff's permit applications violate
unchallenged provisions of the ordinance. 3
It is well-settled that sign-permitting ordinances are prior restraints
because they may deny access to a forum for expression before the
expression occurs.3" However, whether the lack of time limits in the
ordinance at issue is unconstitutional depends on whether the ordinance
is content-based or content-neutral, because "'time limits are required
when their lack could result in censorship of certain viewpoints or ideas
...but are not categorically required when the permitting scheme is

297. 599 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (N.D. Ga. 2009).
298. Id. at 1335.
299. Id. at 1337.
300. Id. at 1339.
301. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
302. Roma Outdoor Creations,599 F. Supp. 2d at 1340.
303. Id. at 1341.
304. Id. at 1344.
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content-neutral. ' ' 31 While the size and height restrictions under
which the sign applications were denied were deemed content-neutral
time, place, and manner restrictions, the processing delay was injury
from which the plaintiff's time-limit claim arose. 3" Therefore, the
court had to consider whether the ordinance as a whole was contentbased rather than evaluating only the provisions under which the
applications were denied. 7 The court determined that the city's sign
ordinance was content-based because it limited the advertising to travel
service facilities, areas of scenic beauty, and public attractions." The
court held that the ordinance, both facially and as applied to the
plaintiff, violated the First Amendment because it was content-based
and lacked a time limit within which the city was required to process
permit applications.'

305.
v. City
306.
307.
308.
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Id. at 1344-45 (alteration in original) (quoting Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc.
of Clearwater, 351 F.3d 1112, 1118 (11th Cir. 2003)).
Id.
Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1345-46.
Id. at 1348.

